SSLab represents the Systems Software & Security Lab from Georgia Institute of Technology led by Prof. Taesoo Kim.
We have been actively working on SGX related research. These research projects can be broadly classified into three different categories: System Design, Defense, and Attack.
- OpenSGX: An open-source platform for SGX research that consists of a QEMU-based emulator and a software development kit (SDK)
- S-NFV: A protection scheme for network function virtualization (NFV) applications that uses SGX to secure the applications' internal states
- AirBox: A secure design of edge function platforms using SGX for ensuring code integrity and data confidentiality of an edge function
- T-SGX: A compiler-level approach that incorporates Intel TSX to prevent SGX enclaves from controlled-channel attacks
- SGX-Shield: A software-based design of SGX enclaves that enables fine-grained address space layout randomization (ASLR)
- Branch Shadowing: A novel side-channel attack against SGX exploiting branch history states preserved across an SGX mode switch and last branch record (LBR)
- Dark ROP: A novel blind return-oriented programming (ROP) attack against SGX exploiting uninitialized registers across an enclave exit
- SGX-Bomb: A rowhammer attack against SGX resulting in processor lockdown, i.e., a cold reboot is necessary to use the machine again
- SGX-Bleed: A vulnerability that can leak uninitialized SGX memory through structure padding
- Leaking Uninitialized Secure Enclave Memory via Structure Padding (Extended Abstract, arXiv.org) [pdf]
- Inferring Fine-grained Control Flow Inside SGX Enclaves with Branch Shadowing (Security 2017) [pdf]
- Enhancing Security and Privacy of Tor's Ecosystem by using Trusted Execution Environments (NSDI 2017) [pdf]